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Steve Dell McNeill v. The State of Nevada, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 54 (July 28, 2016)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Summary 
 
 The Supreme Court determined that the plain language of NRS 213.1243 does not grant 
the State Board of Parole Commissioners authority to impose additional conditions not 
enumerated in the statute when supervising sex offenders on lifetime supervision. 
 
Background 
 
 Appellant Steve McNeill is a convicted sex offender on lifetime supervision. After five 
years of supervision, McNeill was arrested for noncompliance for failure to attend counseling, 
make curfew, and maintain employment. After the state declined to proceed on charges, McNeill 
responded by sending a cease and desist letter to the Division of Parole and Probation (DPP), 
saying that it had no authority over him and to stop contacting him. The State subsequently 
charged McNeill with two counts: (1) violating conditions of his lifetime supervision and (2) 
prohibited acts by a sex offender. The charges alleged that McNeill violated his lifetime 
supervision conditions by refusing to submit to a urinalysis, failing to report, failing to obtain 
residence approval, failing to cooperate with his supervising probation officer, failing to maintain 
full-time employment, failing to abide by a curfew, and being terminated from his sex offender 
counseling.  
 After a three day trial, the jury found McNeill guilty on count one and the district court 
dismissed count two. The court also denied McNeill’s motion for an arrest of judgment because 
it determined that the Board had authority through the language of NRS 213.1243 to establish 
supervision conditions not enumerated by the statute.  
 
Discussion 
 McNeill contended that NRS 213.1243 did not delegate authority to the Board to impose 
additional lifetime supervision conditions not enumerated in the statute. McNeill, therefore, did 
not violate NRS 213.1243, even if he violated the additional conditions imposed by the Board. 
The Supreme Court agreed, concluding that “the plain language of NRS 213.1243 does not 
delegate authority to the Board to impose additional conditions not enumerated.”  
 NRS 213.1243(1) provides that “[t]he Board shall establish by regulation a program of 
lifetime supervision of sex offenders” and that the program must provide for supervision by 
officers in the DPP. Sections 2-12 explicitly set forth the conditions of supervision. Not included 
in the statue is any suggestion that the Board may impose additional conditions not enumerated. 
Without any explicit grant of authority, the omission is presumed deliberate.2 Reading the statute 
as the State suggested—allowing the Board to create additional conditions—would allow the 
Board to create new law, an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.  
The State argued that the Legislature may appropriately delegate authority to 
administrative agencies to facilitate the practical execution of laws it enacts without violating the 
separation of powers. The State cited Sheriff v. Luqman where the Clark County Sheriff’s 
                                                     
1  By Adrian S. Viesca. 
2  Sheriff v. Andrews, 128 Nev. 544, 547–48, 286 P.3d 262, 264 (2012)  
Department appealed from orders granting pretrial habeas corpus relief to people detained for 
violating Nevada’s controlled substance act.3 One of the issues raised in Luqman was whether an 
amendment to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act unconstitutionally delegated legislative 
power to define the elements of a crime to the state board of pharmacy.4  
The Court determined that delegating authority to the state board of pharmacy was not 
unconstitutional because the board was acting as a fact-finder.5 The Act “retained both the 
general and specific guidelines listing various factors which are to be taken into account by the 
pharmacy board when scheduling drugs as well as delineating the requirements by which a drug 
is classified in an appropriate schedule.”6  
The Court found this case distinguishable from Luqman because when the Legislature 
enacted NRS 213.1234, it “did not explicitly provide the Board the authority to create additional 
conditions.”7 Even if the Court assumed that the Legislature meant to do so, “that delegation of 
power would fail” because the Legislature did not provide guidelines to the Board on how it may 
create additional conditions.8  
The district court incorrectly justified its conclusion that the Board may establish 
additional conditions in the text of NRS 213.1243(8): “[A] sex offender who commits a violation 
of a condition imposed on him or her pursuant to the program of lifetime supervision is guilty of 
a category B felony.” (Emphasis added). The district court reasoned, presumably, that if the 
Legislature did not intend to allow the Board to add conditions, it would have narrowed the 
statute to say “a condition imposed . . . pursuant to NRS 213.1243,” instead of “a condition 
imposed . . . pursuant to the program of lifetime supervision.”  
The Court concluded that the language stating, “pursuant to the program of lifetime 
supervision” encompasses conditions enumerated by the Legislature in NRS 213.1243.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Since the Board had no authority to impose additional conditions not enumerated in NRS 
213.1243, the non-enumerated conditions imposed on McNeill were unlawful. And he did not 
violate the law when he did not comply with them.  
However, it is unclear which condition(s) the jury found McNeill violated. The charging 
document and jury instructions allowed the jury to find him guilty based on one or more of the 
identified violations. And only one—failure to have a residence approved—is listed in the 
statute. 9 
Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial 
for allegedly failing to have his residence approved.  
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